An independent laboratory of thought · Volume I

Curiosity is
a public good.

Mathematics you can touch. Psychology you can question. Philosophy you can argue with. Welcome to the mischievous wing of the mind.

Enter the laboratory ↓

Created by Sahil Tayal · The wider universe · No accounts, tracking, or server required.

Department 01 · Mathematics

The wisdom—and folly—of crowds

Condorcet's Jury Theorem: when voters make independent judgments and each is more likely than not to be correct, majority decisions become more reliable as the group grows. Move the sliders and watch the mathematics change.

Collective intelligence simulator

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Probability that a strict majority is correct

Where the theorem breaks

Imagine 101 people evaluating a claim. If each makes an independent judgment with 60% accuracy, the crowd can become highly reliable.

But if everyone repeats the same source, there may be effectively just one judgment. More votes do not automatically mean more information.

Experiment: Set individual accuracy below 50%. Adding more voters now makes the majority less likely to be right.

This model assumes identical accuracy, independence, binary choices, and a definite correct answer. Perfume preference, for example, often has no objectively correct majority answer.

Department 02 · Psychology

The cognitive bias museum

Three small experiments. Choose before revealing the interpretation. These are demonstrations, not diagnostic tests.

Exhibit A · Base rates

The quiet statistician

A person is described as reserved, precise, and fond of spreadsheets. In a town there are 90 salespeople and 10 librarians. Assuming the description is equally likely for either profession, which job is more likely?

Exhibit B · Sunk costs

The expensive ticket

You paid ₹1,500 for a concert. An hour in, you dislike it and can leave safely. Staying has no additional benefit. What should guide your decision?

Exhibit C · Framing

Same facts, different clothes

A treatment helps 90 out of 100 people. Another description says it fails for 10 out of 100 people. If these describe the same evidence, should your assessment change?

Department 03 · Behavioural science

The Identity–Action Gap

Why does wanting to do something not always lead to doing it? This interactive toy model explores the role of intention, available support, energy and friction.

Adjust the conditions

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Illustrative model output: propensity to act

What is this actually showing?

Try holding intention high while increasing friction. Then lower friction without changing motivation.

Important: This is a hypothetical educational simulation inspired by Sahil Tayal's developing Identity–Action Gap framework. The weights and output are illustrative—not empirically estimated, clinically validated, or a prediction of anyone's actual behaviour.

Real behaviour depends on context, habit, opportunity, health, incentives, and many other variables. This lab poses a question; it does not claim to settle it.

Department 04 · Philosophy

The philosophical arena

A good argument isn't the loudest monkey. It is the one that survives the strongest objection.

Choose a question

The argument clinic

Your argument questions will appear here. Nothing is sent to a server.
Department 05 · The living archive

Mercury's notebook

An evolving archive of questions, hypotheses and field notes. A few starter entries are included; add your own short dispatches directly in this browser.

Field notes

Write a dispatch

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Reading room · Primary doors

Follow the evidence

Good intellectual mischief leaves a trail. These are starting points for reading, not claims that the demonstrations above reproduce entire research literatures.

Collective decisions

Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions (1785). For accessible context, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Voting Methods.

Judgment and bias

Tversky & Kahneman (1974), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. DOI ↗

Framing effects

Tversky & Kahneman (1981), The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. DOI ↗ (Search by title if the DOI does not resolve.)

Behaviour design

Fogg (2009), A Behavior Model for Persuasive Design. DOI ↗. Compare this established framework with the proposed Identity–Action Gap.